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Abstract 
In recent decades, the security agenda for states and international organisations has expanded 
dramatically to include a range of ‘non-traditional’, transnational security issues. It is often 
suggested that globalisation has been a key driver for the emergence or intensification of 
these problems, but, surprisingly, little sustained scholarly effort has been made to examine 
the link between responses to the new security agenda and the changing political economy. 
This curious neglect largely reflects the mutual blind-spots of the sub-disciplines of 
International Security Studies and International Political Economy, coupled with the 
dominance of approaches that tend to neglect economic factors. This special issue, which this 
article introduces, aims to overcome this significant gap. In particular, it focuses on three key 
themes: the broad relationship between security and the political economy; what is being 
secured in the name of security, and how this has changed; and how things are being secured 
– what modes of governance have emerged to manage security problems. In all of these 
areas, the contributions point to the crucial role of the state in translating shifting state-
economy relations to new security definitions and practices.    
     
Introduction 
In recent decades, the security agenda for states and international organisations has expanded 
dramatically. Previously, security policy and practice were generally confined to assessing 
and responding to threats to the survival of the state, primarily from military confrontation 
with another state. Now, however, although interstate insecurity remains important, 
particularly in various ‘hot spots’ around the world, a wide, and expanding, range of 
transnational ‘non-traditional’ security (NTS) issues, including such problems as 
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transboundary environmental degradation and climate change, terrorism, transnational crime 
and pandemic disease, increasingly preoccupies policymakers, scholars and ordinary people.  
It is often suggested, by specialists and policymakers alike, that ‘globalisation’ has 
driven the emergence and/or intensification of these new threats. This is either because rapid 
economic development is seen to be escalating environmental change and crisis, or by 
creating transnational infrastructures through which NTS problems are transmitted, thereby 
undermining the capacity of states to secure their borders and populations. The governments 
of the Group of Eight thus described NTS issues as the ‘dark side of globalization’ (G-8 
1999), while efforts to tackle them are  dubbed ‘wars of globalisation’ (Andreas 2013: 22). 
The association of globalisation and NTS has also been accompanied by calls for, as well as 
attempts at, establishing new post-national forms of security governance that match the scale 
of these transnational security problems. The United Nations (UN) High Level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change (2004: 1), for example, in announcing a ‘new security 
consensus’, insists that ‘[t]oday’s threats recognize no national boundaries, are connected, 
and must be addressed at the global and regional as well as the national levels. No State, no 
matter how powerful, can by its own efforts alone make itself invulnerable to today’s threats’.  
Oddly enough, despite this assumed linkage, beyond such remarks there has been 
surprisingly little sustained scholarly examination of the relationship between NTS problems, 
their governance, and the political economy. Scholars concerned with traditional, inter-state 
military security have long sought to understand the ‘economic-security nexus’, often asking 
to what extent economic interdependence may dampen interstate conflict (Mansfield and 
Pollins 2009; Ripsman and Paul 2010; Goldstein and Mansfield 2012). Likewise, the 
literature on the ‘new wars’ and civil wars has identified a link between globalisation and the 
rise of internal armed conflict and ‘warlordism’ (Reno 1998; Ballentine and Sherman 2003; 
Kaldor 2007).2 However, the international security literature dedicated to studying the 
widening and deepening of the security agenda specifically to ‘non-traditional’ issues has 
mainly focused on the expansion of discourses of threat to include new issues and referent 
objects (see esp. Buzan et al. 1998). It has had comparatively little to say on the interrelations 
between this observed expansion, how these new issues are governed in practice, and 
simultaneous changes in the global political economy. The only NTS issue that has been 
closely analysed from a political economy perspective is terrorism. However, this has largely 
involved so-called ‘methodological’ political economy approaches: econometric, rational-
                                                          
2 Reflecting the wider literature, this special issue does not include ‘new wars’ and/or civil wars in its definition 
of NTS, which is what we signify by ‘the new security agenda’; nor do we discuss ‘human security’. 
3 
choice modelling of terrorist and government behaviour and investigation of correlations 
between economic indicators and the incidence of terrorism (see Bueno de Mesquita 2008). 
The relationship between historical transformations in the global political economy, the 
emergence of terrorism as a leading security issue, and how this issue is addressed, remain 
largely unexplored. Similarly, the literatures on global governance, new regionalism, and 
globalisation have tended to focus on economic governance, but have rarely considered the 
expansion of the security agenda and its implications for governance beyond the state, or 
indeed the interrelations between this expansion and broader political economic 
transformations (e.g. Weiss and Wilkinson 2013; Sinclair 2012; Mansfield and Solingen 
2010; Marchand et al. 1999).  
This apparent failure to probe the links between the new security agenda and the 
changing political economy stems partly from historical divisions within the International 
Relations (IR) discipline, and partly from the dominance of NTS studies by approaches that 
largely neglect economic factors. The legacy of IR’s artificial bifurcation into the subfields of 
International Security (IS) and International Political Economy (IPE) is the absence of a 
strong tradition of interrogating the interrrelations between evolutions in economic and 
security dynamics, the examples cited above being exceptions rather than the rule. 
Furthermore, while IPE scholars are alert to the role of non-state actors in governing so-
called ‘low’ politics, the statism of much IS scholarship does not admit such a role in the 
‘high’ politics of security. Path-breaking work that does so is very scarce (e.g. Abrahamsen 
and Williams 2011). Additionally, the study of NTS has been pioneered largely by scholars in 
the constructivist and poststructuralist traditions, who typically downplay or neglect 
economic factors. While producing illuminating accounts of how discursive strategies and 
power-knowledge shape security agendas and policies (e.g. Buzan et al. 1998; Aradau and 
Van Munster 2007), they have generally failed to situate these developments within the 
material evolution of the global political economy. As such, this special issue is the first 
collective effort to understand the relationship between NTS, its governance, and the political 
economy, both theoretically and empirically.  
Theoretically, this special issue attends to the question of the relationship between the 
new security agenda and the political economy by drawing attention to three key issues. The 
first is the broad relationship between political economy and security – how can IPE’s 
concerns, theories and concepts enhance IS studies? The nodal point for this relationship 
appears to be the state. The state is a blind-spot for large parts of IS scholarship, which 
typically remains confined within IR’s ‘territorial trap’ (Agnew 1994), presupposing the fit 
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between state power and the national territory. But even where centralised control over 
national territories is problematised in the literature, the implicit assumption is that these are 
instances of deficient statehood. We delve deeper into the sources and dimensions of state 
power to explore how shifting state-economy relations translate into changing understandings 
and practices of security, with states moving from the consolidation of national markets and, 
correspondingly ‘national security’, to grappling with the ‘dark side of globalisation’.  
The second issue our contributions examine is the important question of what is now 
being secured in the name of ‘security’. Historically, we observe that the object of security 
has shifted increasingly from protecting national states, markets and populations to protecting 
global flows of trade, investment and capital accumulation from the social, economic and 
environmental contradictions caused by capitalist development. This is not to say that the 
new security agenda crudely reflects the narrow economic interests of dominant groups. 
However, because of the inherent links between NTS and the economy, the new security 
agenda does touch on the interests of powerful societal interests, including business, giving 
these groups a stake in how ‘security’ is defined and managed, which often influences 
governance outcomes.    
The third issue is to understand changes in how these objects are being secured: what 
new modes of governance are emerging to tackle threats seen as transnational and too large 
and complex for the old model of sovereign statehood to address? Understanding new modes 
of security governance is crucial because, whereas with ‘traditional’ security problems state 
sovereignty and the inviolability of national control over national territories were seen to 
underpin international security and stability, in the case of NTS issues, insistence on 
sovereignty and non-interference is often seen as the main impediment for developing an 
adequate response. The ‘securitisation’ of transboundary issues is frequently accompanied by 
pressures – often from powerful states and international agencies – to develop new, 
transnational forms of governance that erode sovereign statehood and reconfigure states to 
better contain and manage these threats at their point of origin.  
In studying emergent forms of security governance, this special issue draws particular 
attention to the transformation of statehood, which is also associated with changes in the 
global political economy. The state remains the main site for struggles over security’s 
meaning and its governance, but global capitalist development, as well as political conflicts 
over security governance, are changing the very nature of statehood. The increasingly 
fragmented, regulatory nature of states and associated forms of networked and multilevel 
governance, often observed in economic governance (see Bache and Flinders 2004), are also 
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appearing in security governance, despite the statist expectations of mainstream International 
Relations theory. Indeed, to some extent, the very emergence of NTS on the security agenda 
reflects the prior development of regulatory state forms, where central states merely set broad 
policy directions and considerable autonomy in interpreting and implementing these goals is 
delegated to sub-, quasi- and non-state actors. This is because measuring and managing many 
NTS issues – climate change, environmental degradation and pandemic disease, for example 
– is often seen to require specialised forms of scientific and managerial expertise, free from 
political ‘interference’. In turn, the identification of new security issues may also propel the 
state’s fragmentation further, rather than reinforcing the centralisation of power, again 
contradicting the assumptions of conventional International Relations approaches. A further 
aspect of capitalist development’s influence on security governance is the dominance of the 
neoliberal framing of the state-market relationship, which often directs policymakers towards 
‘market solutions’ to new security threats and risks, with frequently perverse outcomes. The 
mainstream response to climate change, particularly the development of regional and global 
markets for carbon credits, has demonstrated especially clearly the ideological primacy of 
neoliberalism, and the tremendous power of societal interests served by such ‘light touch’, 
market-based responses.  
The theoretical approach taken to these questions is necessarily pluralist, as befits a 
collection exploring a new field. Each contribution takes a political economy approach, 
analysing a particular security issue and its governance in relation to both politics and 
economics simultaneously. However, the contributors’ theoretical understanding of political 
economy varies from liberalism to Marxism, with attendant consequences for the relative 
weight placed upon, and understanding of, class relations and power, as well as the nature 
and role of the state. From an IR theory perspective, the contributions are also diverse. 
Importantly, they include articles by constructivist and poststructuralist scholars that engage 
with economic factors in order to tackle a prior neglect and deepen their respective 
approaches. This eclecticism thus illustrates how proponents of many different approaches 
may begin to probe the political economy of NTS issues and their governance. 
Empirically, the contributions roam widely, demonstrating the significance and 
relevance of the special issue’s themes across different issue-areas and geographical regions. 
The articles cover many of the key NTS issues of our time, including climate change, 
pandemic disease and energy security, as well as key concepts, such as ‘police’ and ‘risk’, 
often used to describe new modes of security governance and the nature of contemporary 
NTS problems respectively. Geographically, the special issue’s contributions refer to 
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practices in diverse parts of the world, including the West, Russia, the Middle East, China, 
Southeast Asia and Australasia. In all regions and across all issue-areas we find that similar 
processes of state transformation are underway in response to the perceived emergence of 
NTS issues, although this process is always contested and uneven, shaped by specific 
political economy and local socio-political struggles.    
This introductory article proceeds to examine the special issue’s three primary themes 
in turn, reflecting on existing research and its limitations, and outlining how the various 
articles advance our understanding of these issues.  
 
Security, Political Economy and the State 
IS scholars have generally understood the expansion of the security agenda to encompass a 
wide range of issues beyond the traditional concern with inter-state warfare and state survival 
in one of two ways. For scholars adopting a realist ontology, it reflects governments’ and 
international organisations’ responses to objective changes in the threat environment. For 
many of these scholars, industrialisation and later the intensification of economic 
globalisation processes are key causal factors in the rise of the new security agenda. Rapid 
economic development is seen to have generated an increased incidence of environmental 
disasters, new infectious diseases, and climate change (Dupont 2001; Brown 2003; Elbe 
2008). Associated improvements in communication and transportation technologies, so 
crucial to the smooth global circulation of capital, are also seen to enable new forms of 
networked organised crime and terrorism (Libicki 2001), rendering the job of governments 
trying to protect populations increasingly difficult.  
The trouble with this perspective is that many NTS issues, like pandemic disease, are 
not new; instead, they have come to be seen and managed differently. For example, the 
‘Spanish flu’ of 1918-19 killed more people than the Great War, but was not seen as a 
‘security’ problem in its own right – only as part of the overall misery of the war and its 
aftermath. The first book dedicated to it was only published in the mid-1970s (Alcabes 2009). 
By contrast, the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak of 2003 was routinely 
described as a security threat and dealt with through a range of quite draconian quarantine 
measures. This is despite SARS only infecting 8,273 people and killing 775 of those infected 
worldwide (Abraham 2007). Why the meaning of security and its governance have changed 
in this way is hard to explain if the emphasis is predominantly on the empirically observed 
severity of a given phenomenon.  
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 The second approach to understanding the rise of new security issues could be 
broadly characterised as social constructivist, although some variants operate from 
specifically poststructuralist premises. These scholars argue that the meaning of security is 
not derived from empirical observations, but from inter-subjectively held assumptions. 
Among this group, particularly influential has been the ‘securitisation’ approach of the 
Copenhagen School (Buzan et al. 1998). For the Copenhagen School, ‘security’ is defined by 
the outcome of successful ‘securitisation’ processes. A speaker, typically a figure of 
authority, describes something as posing an existential threat to a valued referent object. If 
audiences accept this ‘securitisation’, the issue is raised to the top of the political agenda, or 
even above ‘normal’ political discourse and procedures altogether, and is dealt with through 
urgent and exceptional means. The observed expansion of the security agenda is seen to be 
the extension of such processes to issues and referent objects, previously dealt with as routine 
public policy or political issues. While this approach avoids the weaknesses of the realist/ 
empiricist accounts described above, why the security agenda should have expanded quite so 
dramatically in recent decades is not immediately apparent. Because Copenhagen School 
theorists focus on the discursive ‘speech act’ of securitisation, they neglect the material 
aspects of security politics – something an emerging focus on the conditions under which 
audiences ‘accept’ securitising moves has barely begun to address. More specifically, very 
little attention is paid to the links between political economy and security, making it difficult 
to explain the significance of the presumed link between globalisation and the new security 
agenda.  
 What is apparently required is a middle approach that, on the one hand, recognises 
that the new security agenda and shifts in the global political economy are indeed linked, and, 
on the other, recognises that the meanings and practices of security are not given from 
empirical observations alone but are shaped by socio-political contestation. In the 
contributions to this special issue, we argue that the key nodal point for understanding the 
relationship between political economy and security is the state. As economies develop and 
economy-state relations change, the way the state translates economic dynamics into security 
practices also changes.  
At the most general level, the emergence of national security concerns was closely 
associated with the formation of national states and their consolidation of national economic 
markets. This was particularly true in Europe, where these processes were accompanied by 
violent conflicts that further consolidated states’ national territories (Mann 1988; Tilly 1975; 
Hobsbawm 1962, 1975). For several European states, this national consolidation was further 
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fuelled by extra-national empire-building. Although this was often initially driven by 
business actors who maintained their own security apparatuses (Bowen 2006), they were 
gradually supplanted by nation-states, whose growing power was eventually projected 
worldwide to promote and protect imperialist economic interests (Hobsbawm 1987). This 
new security function generated intensifying imperialist rivalries which increasingly 
redounded on intra-European relations, climaxing in two World Wars (Hobsbawm 1994). 
After 1945, the European states lost their empires. The Bretton Woods settlement sought to 
avoid a repeat of past crises through ‘embedded liberalism’: an open trading system premised 
on the development of national economies and nationally based, Fordist social contracts 
between labour and capital (Ruggie 1982). Although this settlement was partly upheld 
through powerful Western states intervening abroad to negate revolutionary threats to 
economic interests (Barnett 1970), the formal sovereignty of nation-states remained the 
cornerstone of the international system and international security practices in this period 
(Barkin and Cronin 1994; Colás 2008). The postwar decades were thus the apogee of the 
consolidation of nation-states as economic units and the bearers of ‘security’ (Agnew 2009).  
 With the crises of global capitalism in the 1970s, the national compromises between 
capital, labour and Western states broke down, exacerbating social conflicts that were 
eventually addressed, to varying degrees, by the neoliberal revolutions pioneered by Thatcher 
and Reagan. Governments dismantled corporatist and protectionist institutions, unleashing 
finance capital from national regulatory contexts to seek new markets, forging transnational 
supply chains. ‘Embedded liberalism’ was jettisoned in favour of ‘flexible accumulation’ 
(Harvey 2006). The economic function of states shifted from the development of national 
economies to the promotion of competitiveness within an increasingly global marketplace – 
the so-called ‘competition state’ or ‘market state’ (Agnew 2009; Jessop 2009; Cerny 1997). 
Correspondingly, the security function of states also transformed. To secure capital 
accumulation, it was no longer sufficient to guard national markets, which in any case were 
again becoming increasingly internationalised. Instead, states became increasingly concerned 
with transboundary flows – often themselves contradictory by-products of capitalist 
development and societies’ growing interconnectedness – that imperilled the movement of 
goods and capital or threatened to upset social or political stability in key economic areas. 
Although this transformation was reinforced by the end of the Cold War, importantly, it 
preceded it: concern for environmental security, and an attendant call for the transcendence of 
sovereign statehood, was already rising by the late 1980s, for example (Mathews 1989; 
Mische 1989). The clearest sign of this shift was the West’s growing focus on ‘fragile’ or 
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‘failed’ states. Weak governance in these domains, perhaps economically insignificant in 
themselves, was seen as generating or enabling transnational flows and risks – such as 
irregular migration, disease, crime, terrorism, piracy and environmental degradation – that 
could ‘spill over’ to other territories (Fukuyama 2004). The 2002 US National Security 
Strategy pithily encapsulated this fundamental reorientation, stating: ‘America is now 
threatened less by conquering states than... by failing ones’ (United States 2002: 1). 
 Several contributors to this volume theorise various aspects of this transformation in 
economy-state-security relations and functions. Phil Cerny identifies a historical 
transformation in the nature of states’ organised violence from warfare to police, which he 
calls the ‘civilianisation’ of security. Cerny argues that the confluence of economic 
globalisation, technological innovation and cross-border awareness, as well as new 
dimensions of global governance, including UN peacekeeping and greater demands for the 
delivery of global public goods, has rendered state-based military means almost irrelevant for 
the provision of security. Indeed, the use of violent force has declined dramatically since the 
1980s, while inter-state warfare is nearly extinct and even intra-state violence is waning 
(Themnér and Wallensteen 2012; Pinker 2012). Instead, the ‘police’ mode of security 
provision, initially developed to pacify states internally as part of the process of national 
consolidation, has globalised, as reflected in the prevalence of peacekeeping and 
statebuilding interventions in the world’s periphery (see also Levi and Hagan 2006). In a 
piece that pioneers a poststructuralist political economy approach, Yee-Kuang Heng and Ken 
McDonagh also explore the implications of historical shifts in the nature of state-economy 
relations for security, but through the prism of risk and risk management rather than 
organised violence. They demonstrate how shifts in the political economy over three 
historical periods have shaped states’ relationship to the management of risk, producing three 
risk management regimes. The first involves maritime insurance in the eighteenth century, in 
which the state had a very limited role. They then examine the Cold War period, in which the 
state, particularly the US, shoulders the role of risk management in relation to the Soviet 
nuclear threat. Finally, they look at the current period, in which the state regulates a wide 
range of private actors in risk management. They argue that these transformations in the 
understanding and management of risk mirror shifts in the underlying political economy, 
from a disaggregated mercantile system, to the postwar Keynesian-Fordist settlement, in 
which states played a key role in securing national development, to a neoliberal system, in 
which states divest themselves of direct economic control and establish facilitating conditions 
for liberal markets.  
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 Some security scholars have argued that the concepts advanced in these two articles to 
denote the changing nature of security, namely police and risk, do not in fact refer to 
‘security’ but to other phenomena. Principally, Ole Wæver (2011) of the Copenhagen School 
has argued against introducing ‘risk management’ into security studies, because it lacks the 
typical ‘emergency’ or ‘exceptional’ responses (in the Schmittian sense) he and his 
colleagues associate with successful securitisation (see Ciută 2009). For us, this misses the 
point. Approaching the state-security nexus through a political economy lens reveals, as the 
contributions here by Cerny, Heng and McDonagh and Dannreuther show, that security’s 
meaning and governance are historically specific, and not timeless or constant. As practices 
evolve, security is no longer exhausted by moments of ‘exception’ and the deployment of 
emergency measures. The governance of terrorism, for example, often does not take this form 
but rather involves the extension of bureaucratic and surveillance techniques from other areas 
of governance (Aradau and Van Munster 2007). To exclude these practices, when the agents 
involved clearly believe they are ‘doing security’, defends the parsimony of the Copenhagen 
School’s theory at the cost of progressively rendering security studies obsolete. 
 
What is Being Secured?  
The question of what is being secured in the name of security has been a particular concern 
for scholars from the ‘Aberystwyth School’ of critical security studies concerned with human 
security (CASE 2006; Booth 1991; Krause and Williams 1997), and for others for whom the 
normative implications of security and securitisation are paramount (see McDonald 2008). 
These scholars argue that the referent object of security should shift from national security 
and the state towards protecting individuals, or ‘human security’. Problems like hunger, 
poverty, domestic violence and so on should be prioritised, it is argued, ahead of traditional 
security concerns relating to defending the national territory. From this perspective, security 
is seen to have potentially emancipatory prospects if directed at worthier recipients of 
protection (Burke 2013). Conversely, Copenhagen scholars view normative considerations, of 
whom security should protect, as second-order questions and keep their theory of 
securitisation descriptive, though the claim that their approach is value-free has not gone 
unchallenged (Hansen 2000; McDonald 2008). Policy-oriented realists have also argued 
against the widening of the security agenda from an implicitly normative perspective, 
suggesting that it distracts states from more dangerous threats (Walt 1991). 
 This debate, however important, has prioritised normative questions over explanatory 
ones, thereby contributing to a tendency within the literature to merely describe, rather than 
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account for, the evolution of the international security agenda. Contributors to this volume, 
however, approach this question directly, through a political economy lens. Several authors 
quite explicitly argue that transnational capitalism is the real object of security, though they 
differ as to whether this is new. In line with the argument above about the role of states in 
securing imperialism, Simon Dalby follows Colleen Bell (2011) in arguing that security in a 
liberal sense has always been about securing ‘freedom’ understood as private property rights, 
and that even Cold War deterrence was ultimately about protecting states so that they could 
get on with expanding capitalism. For Dalby, the contemporary security agenda is no 
different in principle, but reflects the changing nature of state-economy relations and the 
globalisation of capitalism. Contemporary efforts to tackle climate change are powerfully 
shaped by market-based logics, and consequently show no sign of stemming carbon dioxide 
emissions. Likewise, Matt McDonald shows how, despite the initial appearance of successful 
securitisation of climate change in Australia, securing economic growth has trumped, or co-
opted, concerns about the climate, resulting in defeat for those promoting a vigorous response 
to global warming. However, McDonald underscores that material interests do not translate 
automatically into security policy, but are politically mediated. By exploring the discursive 
contestation of and meanings given to material interests, he offers a constructivist analysis of 
the political economy of NTS. 
Roland Dannreuther also shows how economic interests shape what gets secured in 
the name of ‘security’. He points out that ‘energy security’ potentially has several meanings. 
It could, for example, refer to access to energy for poor people in developing countries; but, 
in practice, its primary meaning refers to dominant states’ access to affordable oil or gas. 
Accordingly, energy security concerns appear to be increasing today, not merely because of 
worries over price and availability, but also because the West fears China’s rise may 
potentially upset the dominant, neoliberal mode of market-based energy governance 
established in the 1980s and 1990s. This reminds us that what gets secured in the name of 
security is not necessarily ‘the economy’ in some abstract sense, but quite specific economic 
interests – a point also made by McDonald. Similarly, Heng and McDonagh, when discussing 
the political economy of risk-management, show how particular firms peddling solutions to 
insecurity benefit from the identification of new threats. Thus, part of what is being secured 
in the name of security in this case is the reproduction of military-industrial complexes.     
A related issue here is the apparent disjuncture between the ultimate object of security 
and how this securitisation is expressed politically. As Hameiri and Jones show in their 
contribution, NTS threats are typically seen to be transboundary in nature, giving rise to 
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demands that they be governed transnationally. Similarly, the capitalist economy is 
transnational. And yet, the security politics that emerges from this often assumes a national 
form. Dalby’s argument that Cold War nuclear deterrence was about securing states so they 
could get on with expanding global capitalism clearly expresses this disjuncture. The ultimate 
object being secured was transnational capitalism, but this was achieved by securing a 
specifically national form of state. This apparent mismatch arguably reflects capitalism’s 
ultimate dependence upon states, and how its development has been closely bound up with 
state practices, particularly those of the US (see Panitch and Gindin 2012). In any case, many 
of the contributions to the special issue contend that the disjuncture between the scale of the 
problem being secured and the national focus of government is growing, relative to the Cold 
War period. This seems to mirror trends in the political economy, whereby political 
institutions have largely remained confined to national territories while economic 
organisation has transnationalised.3 This disjuncture clearly fuels calls for the development of 
new modes of governance that transcend the territorial limits of individual nation-states. 
 
How is Security Being Governed? 
The literature on international security has relatively little to say about security governance. 
With rare exceptions, the handful of studies of security governance are typically comparative 
overviews of great powers and formal, regional, interstate organisations, often focused on 
traditional security and defence matters, neglecting the new security agenda (e.g. Kirchner 
and Sperling 2007; Breslin and Croft 2012). The Copenhagen School does not consider 
security governance at all. Their approach implies that the extraordinary means for dealing 
with particular security problems are essentially co-constructed as part of the securitising 
move (Buzan et al 1998: 26). In reality, however, there is often a wide gap between the 
discourse of threat and the actual response. It is not unusual to find that, despite a strong 
rhetoric of securitisation, little actually happens, or that the language is not commensurate 
with the urgency of the response (Caballero-Anthony 2008; Tsoukala 2008). The remarkable 
dominance of the Copenhagen School’s approach, with its constructivist focus on ‘speech 
acts’, has entrenched a relative neglect of governance, and its material context. Some 
poststructuralist approaches to securitisation, mainly the Paris School, do take security 
governance more seriously (CASE 2006; Bigo 2001; Huysmans 2006). Arguably, however, 
                                                          
3 A few scholars argue that political organisation is globalising, e.g., through the emergence of a ‘world state’ 
(Shaw 2000), but the vast majority of literature on ‘global governance’ emphasises its fragmented, messy, 
uneven and often ineffective nature (e.g. Williams and Harman 2013). 
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their narrow focus on the role of security professionals in defining (in)security also pays 
insufficient attention to the wider context – including the political economy relations – within 
which these actors operate, and which may clarify the opportunities and constraints they face 
(Hameiri and Jones 2013).  
 By contrast, the study of new and emerging forms of international and transnational 
governance has been central to IPE’s concerns. Beginning in the 1970s with the concept of 
complex interdependence, and later through studies of international regimes and global 
governance (Sinclair 2012), IPE scholars have developed sophisticated understandings of the 
drivers, dynamics and effects of efforts to manage new issues of international significance, 
such as trade, investment and finance. However, owing to the historical distinction between 
‘high’ and ‘low’ politics, reflected in the sub-disciplinary silos of IS and IPE (Mastanduno 
1998), the significance of this research on governance for security matters has rarely been 
considered. Security scholars too often simply assume that security issues are just too 
important for states to relinquish control over. Yet, what we find in relation to the new 
security agenda is that since the issues examined are at least potentially transnational, many 
of the concerns of the literature on interdependence and global governance are of relevance 
here.  
 In this special issue, explaining the forms security governance assumes is a major 
objective, arising from our concern to understand the implications of the aforementioned 
disjuncture between the scale of NTS problems and the scale at which these are governed. 
The articles advance three basic, but often overlapping positions in this respect. The first is 
that the politico-economic order produced during the Cold War era remains essentially intact 
as the main focal point for international security practices. Simon Dalby argues that, although 
Western states have since retreated from a developmentalist role, in the immediate post-
WWII era they created suburbanised and militarised economies premised on high levels of 
consumption of hydrocarbons. Perpetuating this structure – rather than radically rethinking it 
– is now the focus of those states’ security policies. This leads Western agencies to promote 
the transformation of local institutions in developing countries to create carbon markets – 
e.g., the development of forest plantations as ‘carbon sinks’ – which allows Western 
emissions to be ‘offset’, rather than actually reduced. For Dalby, this constrained 
transformation of governance is never likely to tackle growing climate insecurity.  
The second view, advanced mainly by Philip Cerny, is that the state-based order, 
which is inept at solving new security problems due to the aforementioned mismatch, is 
changing somewhat through new transnational networks for managing these problems, but 
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much more remains to be done. For him, the nature of ‘security’ has been transformed 
profoundly by globalisation, with threats now emanating from non-state actors and conflicts, 
rather than interstate military rivalry. State apparatuses, increasingly enmeshed across 
territorial borders, have begun responding to this challenge by externalising the formerly 
domestic logic of ‘police’, addressing the new threats as ‘criminal’ disruptions of 
international law and order, rather than resorting to war. This has incrementally generated 
experiments in international governance. However, Cerny argues, given the hegemony of the 
nation-state in the imaginations of security practitioners, insecurity often induces a 
contradictory flight back to ‘the obsolete power games of nation-states’. With the global 
system caught between these two logics, Cerny urges a ‘paradigm shift’ away from the state-
based order. 
The third and final position, taken primarily by Hameiri and Jones, Heng and 
McDonagh, and Dannreuther, is that demands for modes of security governance to better map 
onto security threats or referent objects, and particularly for changes in the scale of 
governance, drive the reconfiguration of security governance in far more significant ways. 
However, although change can be observed, it is socially and politically contested and 
constrained by political economy factors inherited from the past. Hence, the form that 
security governance assumes is not given but depends on shifting strategies, power relations 
and conflicts.  
Hameiri and Jones, for example, see contestation over the appropriate scale at which 
an NTS issue is to be governed, as well as struggles to define the instruments and actors 
involved in governing, as being at the heart of the politics of NTS. The claim that security 
governance has to better reflect the scope of the problem is a means by which powerful actors 
seek to shift, or rescale, the management of these issues into new modes of security 
governance, dominated by unelected experts. Drawing on work in political geography 
(Harvey 2006; Massey 1992), they argue that scale is critical because every scalar 
arrangement offers uneven resources, benefits and political opportunity structures to different 
societal groups. The issue for Hameiri and Jones, then, is not whether security governance 
has transformed far enough to meet the needs of the hour, but how and why security 
governance has transformed, if at all, and what are the political and normative implications of 
this transformation, or indeed its absence.  
 A closely related question refers to the function and form that state apparatuses take, 
or should take, in new governance arrangements. As noted earlier, the formation of national 
states and economies is often seen to give rise to ‘national’ security practices and modes of 
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governance: economic development and resources are mobilised by states to enable them to 
make war, which in turn makes states, to paraphrase Tilly’s (1975) famous dictum. As we 
discussed in relation to imperialism, prior to the significant development of national 
economies, states might play a minor role in providing security; but as states take a larger 
role in economic management, so too they enhance their security provision. Heng and 
McDonagh’s paper illustrates this transformation clearly, through its analysis of the political 
economy of risk and risk management. They track the shift from disaggregated, privately 
provided risk insurance in mercantile Europe to centralised, state-provided risk insurance in 
the Cold War. In the earlier period, risk management was not really a security concern at all, 
but an important element in the facilitation of trade. Later, in the Cold War era, new forms of 
securitised risk emerged, particularly in relation to Soviet nuclear power, with the state 
consolidating its legitimacy through both the protection of populations from potential nuclear 
disaster and the provision of social welfare. Their article is also suggestive of a post-Cold 
War move to again outsource security ‘insurance’ provision to the private sector, as the 
state’s intervention in economic management declines. Hameiri and Jones go further, 
identifying the process of state transformation as the dynamic by which NTS governance is 
emerging today. For them, a key precursor for this transformation is the rise of a regulatory 
mode of statehood, which has been accelerated by economic globalisation – initially in the 
West but now increasingly worldwide (Majone 1997; Jayasuriya 2001; Dubash and Morgan 
2013). The delegation and fragmentation of state authority this involves enables the 
promotion of new forms of transnational security governance that network together 
disaggregated state agencies, non-governmental and international actors in complex, 
multilevel arrangements. This process involves the contested rescaling and 
internationalisation of state apparatuses, which privileges various forms of scientific and 
managerial expertise over other political agendas. Like regulatory governance more broadly, 
then, NTS governance attempts to limit the range of issues managed through democratic 
political institutions. However, this is always subject to contestation, shaped by political 




This special issue covers rarely charted territory at the intersection of IS and IPE. The 
apparent rise of a host of ‘non-traditional’ security problems has been attributed by many 
policymakers and observers to intensified economic globalisation. But despite this assumed 
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connection, there has been little analysis of the precise relationship between the NTS agenda 
and the global political economy. The IS literature has tended to see NTS as either a response 
to changes in the real threat environment, or as the extension of securitisation processes from 
interstate security to new challenges and sectors. It has not, however, tended to link these 
analyses to the shifting political economy. IPE literature, on the other hand, despite its central 
concern with political economy and governance, has yet to systematically investigate security 
matters.  
Mindful of this gap in our understanding of NTS, the contributions to this collection 
collectively and individually grapple with a range of questions pertaining to the nexus 
between security and the political economy. As with this introductory article, they are 
organised around three main themes. The first is the broad relationship between political 
economy and security. We argue that the nodal point linking the two is the state. As 
economy-state relations shift and the economy evolves, the way the state translates this 
process into security practices changes also. So while previously security was linked to the 
long-term project of establishing national states, governing national economies and 
populations, currently the partial weakening of this link as a result of globalisation has also 
transformed security’s definition and the state’s security practices. The second theme is the 
question of what is being secured. The contributors argue that it is in fact the economy that is 
being secured in the name of security, although there is disagreement over whether this is 
novel or not. Finally, we examine the nature of security governance, a particularly neglected 
area, in which IPE scholarship potentially has much to offer IS studies. Here, we argue that 
state transformation is a key process through which security governance is emerging in 
relation to NTS. The contributions differ, however, over the extent to which this process has 
occurred, or should occur.   
Considering these insights, the investigation of state transformation and its links with 
security governance presents potentially fruitful avenues for further research. Some tentative 
steps have been taken here but it is clear that much more work is required to analyse the 
factors shaping the internal transformation of states in the process of governing transnational 
security problems. Nevertheless, the special issue clearly establishes that research into the 
new security agenda will remain stunted unless international security specialists and political 
economists break down the sub-disciplinary walls separating these groups.    
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